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Hudec’s Methods—and Ours
Jeffrey L. Dunoff*
I. INTRODUCTION
The republication of Robert Hudec’s Developing Countries
and the GATT Legal System1 (Developing Countries) provides
an apt occasion to reflect on the book’s arguments and enduring
influence. Developing Countries skillfully details the history of
GATT’s relationship with developing states between GATT’s
founding, in 1947, and the mid-1980s. Other symposium
contributions review trade policy developments in the
intervening years.2 In contrast, this essay will explore one of
the most widely noted, and controversial, claims that Hudec
offers in Developing Countries, namely the argument that
developing states’ successful advocacy for nonreciprocal and
preferential treatment had disserved their economic interests.3
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute for International Law & Public
Policy, Temple University Beasley School of Law. This essay was prepared in
connection with a November 2010 ASIL International Law Interest Group
meeting entitled “International Economic Law in a Time of Change:
Reassessing Legal Theory, Doctrine, Methodology and Policy Prescriptions”
held at the University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful to Joel
Trachtman and Frank Garcia for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of
this essay, which draws on arguments developed in Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
Dysfunction, Diversion and the Debate over Preferences: (How) Do Preferential
Trade Policies Work?, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM
45 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., Oxford University Press 2009).
I am also grateful to the conference organizers, Professors Greg Shaffer and
Susan Franck, and to the editors of the Minnesota Journal of International
Law for inviting me to participate in this Symposium.© 2011
1. ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2011) (1987) [hereinafter Developing
Countries].
2. See generally Bernard M. Hoekman, Proposals for WTO Reform: A
Synthesis and Assessment, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011); Chiedu
Osakwe, Developing Countries and GATT Rules: Dynamic Transformation in
Trade Policy Behavior and Performance, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming
2011) (discussing the shift from GATT’s “special and differential” treatment to
policy reforms and liberalization in developing countries).
3. Indeed, Michael Finger’s introduction to the new edition suggests that
Developing Countries is cited most frequently for this proposition. HUDEC,
supra note 1, at 16–17.
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More than two decades after Developing Countries was first
issued, how should we assess Hudec’s claims—and how should
we think about preferences? Given Hudec’s long and
distinguished tenure at the University of Minnesota Law
School—and his central role in the founding of this journal—it
is entirely appropriate that critical examination of Bob Hudec’s
controversial claims occur in the pages of the Minnesota
Journal of International Law.
There is much to admire in Developing Countries;
elegantly written and closely argued, the book deftly combines
incisive political history and careful legal analysis. However,
the book’s claims are necessarily shaped by the methodological
approaches Hudec adopts, the theory of trade politics he
employs, and the ontology of international system that he
draws upon. Part I of the book, consisting of Hudec’s
authoritative retelling of GATT debates over preferences, reads
as a straightforward realist account of international trade
relations. In this retelling, states are the key actors and they
both view and use trade negotiations as vehicles to advance
their political and economic interests. Part II of the book,
containing Hudec’s influential analysis of the effects of
preferences, has a strikingly different theoretical and
methodological orientation. Here, analysis turns from interstate relations to a public choice account of interactions among
interest groups and bureaucracies. In the writings of a less
talented author the apparent tension between the differing
methodological approaches could be easily dismissed; in
Hudec’s case they provide an important clue to understanding
the assumptions that drive much of Hudec’s analysis. In short,
virtually all of Developing Countries’ conclusions are premised
upon a highly stylized and deeply pessimistic view of the
processes and outcomes of both domestic politics and
international institutions.4
However, Hudec’s methods are not the only possible ones
that can be used to understand the effects of preferences, and
since Developing Countries was first issued much empirical
work has focused on the implications of preference programs. I
4. In focusing upon Hudec’s methodological commitments, this paper
stands in stark contrast with much of the writing on Hudec’s scholarship,
which emphasizes Hudec’s pragmatism and elides the ideological and
methodological commitments that inform this pragmatism. In this respect,
Ricardo Ramirez contribution to this symposium is representative of most
approaches to Hudec’s scholarly work. See Ricardo Ramirez, Professor Hudec
and the Appellate Body, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011).
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summarize below recent empirical (largely econometric)
literature addressing the effects of preferences. As we shall see,
some of this more recent research suggests some important
qualifications to Hudec’s rather bleak view of preferences—and,
perhaps, his equally bleak view of the performance of domestic
and international political actors. More importantly,
juxtaposing Hudec’s methodologies with more recent
alternative methodological approaches suggests several
potentially fruitful lines of future research.
The final section of this paper explores yet another
dimension of Hudec’s methodological commitments and
rhetorical style. Although many properly praise Hudec’s lean
and jargon-free prose, this paper will show Developing
Countries is significantly more theoretically sophisticated than
it purports to be, and offer a few reasons why the book, in
effect, misrepresents itself. This paper also describes some of
the costs of selling Developing Countries short. By implication,
this analysis suggests a number of methodological issues that
contemporary trade scholarship should address in light of the
ways that the discipline of trade law has evolved since
Developing Countries was first issued.
II. THE DEBATE OVER PREFERENCES AT THE GATT
Developing Countries opens with the history of a debate
that has bedeviled the trade system since its inception—and
continues to be controversial today.5 Given that trading nations
enjoy widely varying levels of economic and social development,
should the trade system provide differential and more favorable
treatment to developing states? In particular, should goods
from developing states enjoy preferential access to the markets
of developed states? Or does preferential treatment introduce
distortions into international markets—and thus, are uniform,
nondiscriminatory
rules
more
appropriate?
Hudec’s
authoritative account of the twists and turns in debates over
preferences thoughtfully reviews the key issues in this longstanding controversy.
Hudec notes that when considering whether to extend
preferential treatment to developing state goods, the framers of
5. See, e.g., SALLIE JAMES, THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES: HELPING THE POOR BUT AT WHAT PRICE? 1 (CATO Institute
2010),
available
at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12555
(proffering that the Unites States’ Generalized Policy of Preferences distorts
markets and limits the economic development of developing countries).
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the GATT system had little relevant experience to draw on.6
Although the destructive trade wars and mercantile policies of
the 1930s provided GATT’s drafters with concrete knowledge
regarding tariffs, quotas, and similar issues, the negotiators
had little relevant experience regarding the role of developing
states in a multilateral trade system.7
The basic positions of the key actors in the negotiations
were relatively straightforward—but nearly impossible to
reconcile.8 The United States, the dominant economic and
political actor and a prime mover in the negotiations, sought a
non-discriminatory system that had no special rules for
developing states.9 Contrariwise, the Europeans sought to
maintain a version of preference systems historically associated
with their colonial possessions.10 Both positions reflected
national interests. As the world’s strongest economy, the
United States believed that it had the most to gain from open
world markets.11 The Europeans believed that market
interventions were necessary to assist developing states.12
Moreover, European resistance to a strong nondiscrimination
norm was rooted in their collective interest in extending
preferential treatment to each other to boost post-war
European reconstruction.13 Developing states sought special
treatment in the trade realm, including resource transfers,
freedom from trade disciplines, tariff preferences, and nonreciprocity.14 Hudec suggests that developing states’ positions
6. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 26–27.
7. See id. (“Not only was there no Golden Age to point towards as a goal
but, perhaps more important, there had been no past failures that could serve
as a lesson about what not to do.”).
8. Leading accounts of the negotiations include: WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN,
JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE (1950);
RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY (1956); DOUGLAS A.
IRWIN, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & ALAN O. SYKES, THE GENESIS OF THE GATT
(reprt. 2009); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969);
CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE (1949); THOMAS W. ZEILER,
FREE TRADE, FREE WORLD: THE ADVENT OF THE GATT (1999).
9. The U.S. push for an end to discriminatory trade rules should not be
understood to mean that the United States was unaware of the special issues
posed by developing states. Rather, the U.S. argued that the needs of
developing states should be addressed in other fora, such as the United
Nations and World Bank. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 28–29.
10. Id. at 28.
11. Id. at 29.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 30.
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grew out of their colonial experience, in which they saw colonial
powers attempt to maximize economic gains by controlling
trade and suppressing economic competition.15 In addition,
developing states were acutely aware of developed nations’
protectionist tendencies, such as the U.S. enactment of SmootHawley tariffs.16
Initiating a pattern that would recur throughout GATT’s
history, no single party’s view ultimately prevailed in the
negotiations, and the discussions “ended, as they had begun,
with no basic consensus on the trade-policy rules that should
apply to developing countries.”17 As a result, the original GATT
contained many terms that reflected parts of various parties’
positions. Thus the text contained several provisions developing
states favored, including clauses permitting trade restrictions
to protect infant industries and for balance-of-payments
purposes.18 However, the original GATT did not adopt the
principle of preferential access to developed states’ markets
that developing states sought.
Hudec perceptively notes that state practice during GATT’s
early
years
introduced—and
eventually
embedded—
“fundamental . . . contradiction” into the trade regime.19 For
instance, the United States purported to insist on “reciprocity,”
that is, that any actions it took to liberalize access to U.S.
markets should be paid for—or reciprocated—by reductions in
trade barriers by other states. Hudec argues that the United
States’ “fixation with reciprocity” reflected the country’s
mercantilist view of international trade.20 The implicit theory
underlying this view is that policies that increase exports are
desirable while those that increase imports are undesirable;
hence states offer to make “concessions” in lowering their own
trade barriers to obtain similar “concessions” from trading
partners.21 Of course, if reducing one’s own trade barriers is
understood to be a costly “concession,” then it follows that
maintaining (or raising) barriers will be understood as a
benefit. Hudec argues that the United States’ mercantile
15. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 30.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 31.
18. Id. at 31–32.
19. See id. at 34 (identifying the contradictory nature of developed states
demanding trade liberalization policies and “payment”).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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approach to trade policy implicitly legitimated developing state
demands for differential treatment.22 Accordingly, the United
States in effect shifted the basis for all future debate from
“whether” preferential treatment was appropriate to “how
much” assistance to give: “Once it had been conceded, as a
matter of principle, that legal freedom [from GATT disciplines]
constitutes ‘help’ to developing states, the future was virtually
fixed.”23
Developing Countries proceeds to detail that future. Hudec
notes that, during GATT’s first decade, trading nations learned
that once a negotiation begins, all parties have to be prepared
to “give” something, and that “the easiest concession [for
developed states] to ‘give’ is a little more legal freedom.”24
Hudec demonstrates that, by 1955, GATT documents reflected
a “fuller and now almost enthusiastic endorsement of the idea
that
legal
freedom
‘helps’
developing
countries.”25
Consequently, “[t]he declining rigor of GATT legal discipline
towards developing countries produced a rather curious legal
policy. The substance withered, but the form remained.”26
In 1959, an influential GATT report directed attention to
the link between disappointing developing state export
earnings and developed state trade barriers.27 As a result,
developing countries began to focus less on securing exceptions
for their own policies and more on obtaining preferential access
to developed state markets. Hudec’s account of the contentious
and extended debates over the extension of preferences to
developing states over the next several decades is, in many
respects, a story of form without substance. Time and again,
richer nations agreed to texts that seemed to promise
preferential treatment to developing states, but these
instruments often said less than they appeared to, and
frequently delivered less than they promised.
By the 1960s, developing states were organizing to advance
a collective voice in trade policy, and successfully pushed for
the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade
22. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 35.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 43.
25. Id. at 42–43.
26. Id. at 44.
27. See id. at 43–44 (noting how developing countries were using more
balance-of-payments restrictions in spite of substantial economic growth (in
absolute terms)).
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and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 as a counterweight or
alternative to GATT.28 Developments at UNCTAD changed the
political dynamics within GATT, and in late 1964 GATT parties
finalized drafting new treaty language.29 A new Part IV of
GATT, entitled “Trade and Development,” came into effect in
1966.30 The new language acknowledged that market access for
exports from developing states has to be improved; however it
did not prescribe the methods for doing so.31 Significantly, all of
the new language in Part IV was carefully worded not to
impose new legal obligations on the developed contracting
parties.32 Nevertheless, Part IV can be seen as a formal
institutional acknowledgment that action was necessary to
increase developing state access to developed state markets.
Preferences were debated at a 1968 UNCTAD meeting in
India, and in 1970 UNCTAD adopted “Agreed Conclusions”
regarding the establishment of a “Generalized System of
Preferences.”33 Since preferential tariff treatment for
developing state goods would violate GATT’s most favored
nation provision, in 1971 GATT members agreed to a ten-year
waiver permitting—but not requiring—states to grant
preferential tariff treatment to developing state goods.34 In
1979, GATT parties removed the waiver’s time limits through
adoption of a decision commonly known as the “Enabling
Clause,”35 which authorizes certain forms of preferential
28. G.A. Res. 1785, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc
A/5217, at 14 (Dec. 8, 1962).
29. See HUDEC, supra note 1, at 64 (noting GATT’s reinvigorated
commitment to the interests of developing states).
30. Id. at 66.
31. See id. at 64 (describing how Part IV—from a technical point of view—
“added nothing to the existing legal relationship between developed and
developing countries.”).
32. See, e.g., id. (indicating how new article XXXVII, entitled
“Commitments,” requires developed states to take certain actions “to the
fullest extent possible – that is, except when compelling reasons, which may
include legal reasons, make it impossible” to do so).
33. See id. at 69 (clarifying that “developed countries would grant tariff
preferences to all (or almost all) developing countries, without reciprocity, on
all (or almost all) products.”).
34. Id. at 70.
35. The formal name for the “Enabling Clause” is the “Decision on
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries.” Adopted in November 1979, it includes
a number of provisions permitting GATT contracting parties to grant
differential and more favorable treatment to developing states,
notwithstanding the non-discrimination requirement found in GATT Article I.
It thus authorizes, most notably, trade concessions granted to developing
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treatment. Hudec notes that although this text used language
that appeared to be “legalistic” and thus produced the “illusion
of greater commitment,” it actually “contained no definable
legal obligations.”36 Therefore, this much-debated text “added
nothing to the existing legal relationship between developed
and developing countries.”37
The story of the Enabling Clause encapsulates, in many
respects, the politics of the debate over preferences at the
GATT. Over time, developing states repeatedly demanded new
and different forms of preferential treatment, and developed
states would, for a time, resist these pleas. Predictably, a
compromise would result that recognized in principle the
legitimacy of preferential treatment, but that imposed little by
way of legal obligation and often produced little economic effect.
Hudec summarizes the “pattern” that emerged:
. . . [A]s experience with this tactic [of demanding preferential
treatment] grew, it could be seen that results would continue to be
very slow in coming. . . . The absence of any real progress led to a
continual search for additional forms of activity that would give the
appearance of movement. The GATT became very skillful in creating
such appearances, primarily by erecting new procedural mountains
and them climbing them. The GATT’s work evolved into a slow and
patient form of bureaucratic slogging – unending meetings, detailed
studies of trade flows and trade barriers and repeated declarations in
increasingly urgent but never-quite-binding language.38

History does not proceed along a straight path, and
developments subsequent to publication of the first edition of
Developing Countries represent an important turn in the
trajectory that Hudec outlines. The Uruguay Round, in
particular, marked a significant shift with respect to the role
and treatment of developing states in the trade system. First,
developing states began to play a significant role in the
negotiating process.39 At the same time, many developing
states under various Generalized System of Preference (GSP) programs.
HUDEC, supra note 1, at 64, 85.
36. Id. at 64.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 55.
39. See generally AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT & WTO
(2003) (providing a detailed study of the bargaining coalitions strategically
formed by developing states in the GATT and WTO). It should be noted that
although the Uruguay Round marked an increase in participation, following
the conclusion of the Round many developing states raised significant
concerns about the nature and quality of their participation. For an analysis,
see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence
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states were engaged in a process of significant economic reform.
For instance, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of
the Washington Consensus—not to mention decades of
disappointing economic results—prompted many developing
states to embrace trade liberalization and privatization as
mechanisms to spark economic growth.40 Thus, in the Uruguay
Round agreements, developing states accepted obligations to
reduce their own trade barriers, including bindings on a
substantial number of tariff lines.
More importantly, the Round’s “single undertaking”
produced a largely uniform system of rights and obligations.41
Hence, WTO texts reduced the scope of special exceptions from
GATT disciplines available to developing states. Moreover, just
as the number and scope of legal obligations increased, the new
Dispute Settlement Understanding rendered these obligations
judicially enforceable.42 Many argue that, taken together, these
changes reduced the policy flexibility of developing states.
Yet, the concept of “special and differential” treatment for
developing states did not disappear entirely in the Uruguay
Round. While developing states assumed the same obligations
as developed states, in many cases they were granted
additional time to implement these obligations.43 Therefore, the
new agreements represented an important shift from a
nonreciprocal approach to obligations to a nonreciprocal
approach to implementation. However, in the post-Uruguay
Round period, developing states experienced capacity
constraints and other obstacles that rendered implementation
difficult or disproportionately costly.44 Developing states
and Coherence, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 979, 980–81 (2001).
40. See John Williamson, Williamson Versus the Washington Consensus?,
THE GROWTH BLOG (Oct. 12, 2008), http://www.growthcommissionblog.org/con
tent/williamson-versus-the-washington-consensus (identifying the need for
macroeconomic stability, integration into the world economy, and the actual
use of the market as the principal values that motivated the creation of the
Washington consensus).
41. See Dunoff, supra note 39, at 1007 (clarifying that all parties at the
Round must participate in all negotiated agreements as a “single
undertaking.”).
42. Id. at 1010.
43. See generally J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of
Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge, 23 WORLD ECON.
511 (2000) (discussing some of the problems developing states faced when they
attempted to implement the Round’s obligations).
44. See id. at 511 (categorizing the obligations as investment decisions
rather than policy commitments).
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consequently demanded greater amounts of time to meet
certain obligations, and for more useful information about
relevant requirements.
In 2001 a new round of trade negotiations was launched in
Doha, Qatar. The Doha Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed the
importance of special and differential treatment of developing
states.45 It called for a review of provisions affording such
treatment, with the goal of “making them more precise,
effective and operational.”46 However, the on-again, off-again
talks seem to have run aground; in particular, the negotiators’
efforts to improve provisions regarding treatment of developing
states have, to date, borne little fruit.47
Significantly, in recent years much attention has shifted
away from the debate over discriminatory trade policies,
largely because of a perception that these policies have enjoyed
only moderate success (as discussed in more detail below). An
emerging consensus argues that access to developed state
markets is necessary but not sufficient, as supply-side capacity
and trade-related infrastructure constraints inhibit the ability
of developing states to realize the potential benefits of
preference programs. Hence, attention has shifted to
identifying ways to provide more direct assistance to improve
the competitiveness of developing state firms. Such
considerations have produced an “Aid for Trade” agenda that
has attracted substantial diplomatic and academic energies.48
45. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 ¶ 13 (emphasizing that “special and
differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all
elements of the negotiations . . . .”).
46. Id. ¶ 44.
47. As this is written (in fall 2010), the fate of these negotiations is
uncertain, although it is difficult to be optimistic. For analysis of some of the
difficulties impeding progress, see Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round:
Devilish Details, Grand Themes, and China Too, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 (2009);
Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations, 45
TEX. INT’L L.J. 573 (2009).
48. For a sampling of developed state plans, see, for example, Conclusions
of the Council and of the Representatives of the Gov’t of the Member States
Meeting Within the Council on EU Strategy on Aid for Trade: Enhancing EU
Support for Trade-Related Needs in Developing Countries, 14470/07 (Oct 29,
2007), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st14/st14470.e
n07.pdf; Dep’t for Int’l Development [DFID], Sharing the Benefits of Trade,
Strategy 2008–12 (2008); SDC, UNITED SWISS DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
STRATEGY—MESSAGE ON COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTH 2009–12 (2008),
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dfid.gov.u
k/Media-Room/News-Stories/2008/UK-launches-Aid-for-Trade-Strategy/.
Furthermore, international bodies have produced a number of reports. See,
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This paper shall discuss the shift toward “Aid for Trade” and its
relationship to some of the ideas in Developing Countries, in
part III below.
Developing Countries’ account of the history of debates
over preferences is nothing if not sobering. As Hudec tells the
story, trading nations devoted substantial diplomatic attention
over many years to the treatment of developing states.
However, what these long-standing efforts generated was an
inconclusive political debate that in turn produced ambiguous
legal texts. The crucial question, of course, is whether
preference programs are effective. This paper shall
demonstrate there are various ways to approach this question.
III. DO PREFERENCE PROGRAMS WORK?
The second part of Developing Countries transitions from
historical narrative to evaluation: What is the impact of special
and differential trade policies? Does the granting of
preferential access to developed state markets boost developing
state economies? Or, as Hudec frames the inquiry, “[i]s the
current GATT legal policy [of providing preferences] in the best
interest of the developing countries themselves, or would
developing countries achieve better results under a legal policy
based on . . . reciprocity and non-discrimination?”49
These sound like empirical questions, and a substantial
amount of econometric literature purports to provide empirical
answers to these questions. However, Developing Countries
does not draw appreciably upon econometric literature.50 To be
e.g., NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, AID FOR TRADE AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT, available at http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/96DEA4
F0-F203-1EE9-B4C334E151D151DF; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION &
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, AID FOR
TRADE AT A GLANCE 2009: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM (2009). The World
Economic Forum produces an annual assessment of obstacles to trade, with a
focus on market access, border administration, transport and
telecommunications infrastructure, and general business environment. See
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL ENABLING TRADE REPORT 2010
(2010), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalEnablingTrade
_Report_2010.pdf. A sampling of the academic commentary can be found in
AID FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (Dominique Njinkeu & Hugo Cameron
eds., 2007).
49. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 115.
50. Indeed, the text explicitly disclaims any intent to engage any
empirical literature, stating that “[i]t is not the purpose of this study to
examine it [empirical literature] in any depth.” Id. at 116. Thus, although the
text references the empirical literature from time to time, it does not analyze
this literature in any sustained fashion.
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sure, much of the literature has been published after
Developing Countries was first released. Still, the decision not
to survey the available empirical literature is puzzling given
that all relevant actors in the preferences debate agree on the
goal of providing greater economic benefits to developing states;
the central point of contention is whether preferences in fact
advance this objective.51
Rather than undertake an empirical evaluation, Hudec
makes an unexpected analytical move; part II of Developing
Countries evaluates the effects of preferences through a
political economy lens. In particular, Hudec examines whether
developed states’ preference programs make it more or less
difficult for developing states to pursue liberal economic
policies. Since both the econometric and the political economy
approaches can enrich our understanding of the effects of
preferences, this paper briefly reviews the empirical literature
on preferences that Developing Countries does not address, and
then summarizes Hudec’s political economy arguments. This
paper will demonstrate that each line of analysis provides
ample reason to doubt the utility of preferential treatment.
A. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF PREFERENCES
Today, all developed states—and a number of developing
states—have adopted GSP programs that grant preferential
tariff treatment to goods from developing and least developed
states.52 In addition, several states, including prominently the
United States and the EU, have enacted preferential tariff
programs targeted at specific groups of developing states.53
The commonplace implementation of GSP programs has
51. See id. at 132–34 (focusing on “the extent to which the theoretical
welfare gains [from preference policies] are likely to be achieved in practice,
the actual cost of achieving those gains and whether the gains are likely to
outweigh the costs.”).
52. Under the United States’ GSP program, for example, 131 beneficiary
developing states, including 43 least-developed states, are eligible to export
approximately 4,800 types of products duty free into the United States. See
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/prefere
nce-programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp (last visited Feb. 22, 2011);
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES GUIDEBOOK (2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_sen
d/1597.
53. See, e.g., Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 19 U.S.C. § 2701
(1983); Andean Trade Preference Act 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (1991); African Growth
and Opportunity Act 19 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000).
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inspired a substantial amount of literature examining the
empirical effects of preference programs. Although no
consensus exists in this large body of scholarship, it is fair to
say that much of this literature is deeply skeptical about the
economic and development effects of preferences. Specifically,
the weight of the econometric and simulation analysis
undertaken to date suggests that preference programs are
underinclusive and underutilized, that the benefits generated
by preference programs are limited and narrowly focused, and
that preferences have contributed disappointingly little to
economic development in beneficiary states.54 Since the various
limitations of preference programs have been ably and
thoroughly discussed elsewhere, a brief summation of the
arguments is presented below.
One factor that significantly reduces the value of
preferential treatment is the wide-spread exclusion of goods in
developed state preference programs from sectors in which
developing states enjoy a comparative advantage.55
Particularly controversial examples of limitations on
economically significant goods include the strict limitations on
imports of sugar from the United States’ Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI),56 the exclusion of tuna, leather and footwear
products, petroleum products and apparel from the United
States’ Andean Trade Preferences Act,57 and highly complex
rules regarding apparel found in the United States’ African
Growth and Opportunity Act.58 Conversely, developing state
54. See KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, OPEN MARKETS FOR THE POOREST
COUNTRIES: TRADE PREFERENCES THAT WORK (2010); Caglar Ozden & Eric
Reinhardt, Unilateral Preference Programs: The Evidence, in ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 189 (Simon J.
Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006); Caglar Ozden & Eric Reinhardt,
The Perversity of Preferences: GSP and Developing Country Trade Policies,
1976–2000, 78 J. DEV. ECON. 1 (2005).
55. See, e.g., Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries,
INT’L MONETARY FUND (Nov. 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/200
1/110801.htm (describing how developing states often enjoy a comparative
advantage in labor-intensive industries and agricultural products, yet
developed states often exclude those products from preference programs).
56. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(d). The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act is an
extension of CBI; notably the bill extends eligibility for preferential tariff
treatment to a number of sensitive products, including apparel and petroleum
products. Id. at § 2703(b)(4).
57. 19 U.S.C. § 3201 (b)(1)–(2). As amended by the Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Program, preferences were extended to these
goods, subject to restrictive rules of origin. Id. at § 3202(d)(11).
58. See Raj Bhala, The Limits of American Generosity, 29 FORDHAM INT’L
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goods often receive preferential trade treatment in markets
where they do not compete.59
As states successfully export certain goods, or are dropped
entirely from preferential programs, they may be left with
overcapacity and a production structure that does not reflect
comparative advantage.60 Moreover, the U.S. and EU GSP
programs also contain safeguard clauses that permit
preferences to be suspended for certain products or states if
those imports cause real or potential injury to domestic
producers.61
Further, many preference programs condition the grant of
preferences. For example, the 1984 amendments to the United
States’ GSP program authorized the United States Trade
Representative to condition the grant of preferences on, inter
alia, the beneficiary state’s intellectual property and labor
rights protections.62 In 1994, the EU added provisions to its
GSP program authorizing the withdrawal of trade preferences
contingent on a beneficiary state’s labor policies and,63 in 1998,
the EU added special preferences conditioned on labor,
environmental, and anti-drug trafficking policies.64 Developed
states have repeatedly invoked such conditions to exclude, or
threaten to exclude, certain developing states from preferential
L.J. 299, 382 (2006) (discussing the inherent irony in the African Growth and
Opportunity Act as the added complexities of the rules create disincentives to
obtain the Act’s benefits).
59. Celine Carrere & Jaime de Melo, The Doha Round and Market Access
for LDCs: Scenarios for the EU and US Markets, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 251, 268
(2010).
60. See Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and Differential
Treatment in the WTO: Why, When and How?, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 147, 157–159 (Simon J. Evenett &
Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2006).
61. VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33663, GENERALIZED
SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE 8 (2008).
62. GSP Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–573, § 503, 98 Stat. 2948,
3019 (1984).
63. 2001 O.J. (C311) 47.
64. DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TRADE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE
EUROPEAN UNION’S GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES 6–9 (2004),
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/march/tradoc_116448.pd
f. India challenged the EU’s special tariff program in European Communities.
See generally Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Conditions for
the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R
(Apr. 7, 2004) (providing India’s arguments against EU’s trade preferences).
For an analysis, see Jeffry L. Dunoff, When— and Why— Do Hard Cases Make
Bad Law? The GSP Dispute, in WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 283
(George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007).
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tariff treatment. For example, the Central African Republic,
Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire and Mauritania were all denied
preferential treatment under the AGOA statute following
political events such as coups and failures to implement
democratic reforms.65
In addition, most preference programs are legislated to last
a certain number of years then expire, and must then be
reauthorized. Legislative reauthorization is, of course, never
guaranteed, and has at times occurred on a retroactive basis
following expiration of the program. For example, the United
States’s GSP program has been renewed a number of times
since its inception in 1974; at least eight of these legislative
renewals have been after periods of expiration ranging in
length from two to fifteen months. Most recently, the GSP
program expired on December 31, 2010, and as of early 2011 it
was unclear whether, and when, it will be renewed. Similarly,
the Andean preference program expired in December 2001; it
was renewed in late 2002 and several times thereafter. Most
recently, in 2009, Congress extended the program until
December 31, 2010.66
Both individually and in the aggregate, these statutorilymandated features of preference programs introduce
substantial commercial uncertainties, and hence lowered the
incentives to invest in eligible sectors. Simply put, investors
and importing firms attracted by preferences have reduced
incentives to invest in or source from beneficiary states when
both the legal status and longevity of the preferences is in
doubt.
A number of other factors tend to reduce developing states’
ability to take advantage of the preferences that are potentially
available. Perhaps most importantly, complex rules of origin
and relatively high administrative costs result in significant
underutilization of available preferences.67 In 1999, for
65. Compare General Country Eligibility Provisions, AGAO.GOV,
http://www.agoa.gov/AGOAEligibility /index.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2011),
with DANIELLE LANGTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31772U.S. TRADE AND
INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE AFRICAN
GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT AND BEYOND 25 (2008).
66. Press Release, USTR, USTR Ron Kirk Welcomes Extension of GSP
and ATPA Programs (Dec. 28, 2009).
67. Rules of origin set the conditions a product must satisfy to be
considered as originating from a beneficiary state. For a classic piece on origin
in preference programs and their costs, see JAN HERIN, RULES OF ORIGIN AND
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TARIFF LEVELS IN EFTA AND IN THE EC, European
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example, just one third of EU imports eligible for preferences
actually entered the EU with a reduced tariff, largely due to
complex and restrictive rules of origin;68 during the same year,
excluding minerals, only four percent of eligible U.S. imports
from developing countries received preferential treatment.69 A
more recent study found that the share of eligible exports to the
EU that requested GSP treatment was only six percent.70
Similarly, for the United State’s GSP program, the utilization
rate of many tariff lines is zero, and the average for all lines is
25%.71 Conversely, liberalization of restrictive rules of origin
can produce significant results, as changes to AGOA and
Canada’s GSP program demonstrate.72
Finally, the gains that result from preferential tariff
programs tend to be narrowly concentrated.73 Consider, for
Free Trade Association Occasional Paper No. 13 (1986). For more recent
research, see U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, 3906, THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS: FIFTH UPDATE 2007
(2007); Patricia Augier, Michael Gasiorek & Charles Lai Tong, The Impact of
Rules of Origin on Trade Flows, 20 ECON. POL’Y 567 (2005).
68. Paul Brenton & Miriam Manchin, Making EU Trade Agreements
Work: The Role of Rules of Origin, 26 WORLD ECON. 755, 757 (2003).
69. Id.
70. Miriam Manchin, Preference Utilisation and Tariff Reduction in EU
Import from ACP Countries, 29 WORLD ECON. 1243, 1247 (2006). Manchin also
reports that ACP states utilized Cotonou preferences (which are generally
better than GSP preferences) close to 50% of the time. Id. at 1246. Another
study found that utilization rates for preferences granted by Canada, the EU,
Japan, and the U.S. are 61, 31, 46 and 67% respectively. Sub-Committee on
Least-Developed Countries, Market Access Issues Related to Products of Export
Interest Originating from Least-Developed Countries, 14, WT/COMTD/LDC/W/
31 TN/MA/S/11 (Sept. 29, 2003).
71. Daniel Lederman & Çaglar Özden, U.S. Trade Preferences: All Are Not
Created Equal 3 (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 280, 2004).
72. For background reading on some of the effects of liberalization, see
Aaditya Mattoo, Devesh Roy & Arvind Subramanian, The Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act and its Rules of Origin: Generosity Undermined?, 26 WORLD
ECON. 829 (2003); Denis Audet, Smooth as Silk? A First Look at the Post MFA
Textiles and Clothing Landscape, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 267 (2007); José Anson,
Marc Bacchetta & Matthias Helble, Using Preferences to Promote LDC
Exports: A Canadian Success Story?, J. WORLD TRADE 285 (2009).
73. For background reading, see UNCTAD, Trade Preferences for LDCs:
An
Early Assessment
of Benefits and
Possible Improvements,
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/8 (2003). See also Drusilla K. Brown, General
Equilibrium Effects of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, 54 S. ECON.
J. 27 (1987). Note that some strands of economic theory suggest that this
concentration of benefits, or “lumpiness,” should not be a surprise as in a
competitive global environment, comparative advantage may be narrowly
concentrated in a few tasks. See, e.g., Ricardo Hausmann & Dani Rodrik,
Economic Development as Self-Discovery, 72 J. DEV. ECON. 603 (2003) (noting
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example, the United State’s AGOA program. In 2003,
approximately 33 Sub-Saharan African states were eligible for
preferential treatment under AGOA. However, three states—
Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon—accounted for over 86% of
total AGOA imports.74 Benefits were similarly highly
concentrated in a few economic sectors. In 2003, energy-related
products represented 79.5 per cent of U.S. purchases from subSaharan states; the second largest sector, textiles and apparel,
accounted for 8.5 per cent of US imports.75 Within the apparel
sector, the seven sub-Saharan states that accounted for 99% of
exports to the United States before AGOA also captured 99% of
exports after AGOA was enacted.76 Similar results were
obtained with other preferential programs;77 as a general
matter “the top ten beneficiaries . . . generally account for 80–
90 percent of total imports . . . receiving preferences under any
individual scheme.“78 Even more troubling, emerging literature
suggests that a substantial share of the “benefits” generated by
preferential market access may accrue to importers in
developed states, rather than exporting firms in the beneficiary
state.79
Taken together, the features identified above have
significantly reduced the economic and developmental impacts
of preferential programs. Trade effects are historically difficult
to estimate accurately, but some conclusions can be drawn from
narrow specialization of many countries).
74. 5 USITC U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFR. 2–4
(2004).
75. Id. at iii.
76. Marcelo Olarreaga and Çalgar Özden, AGOA and Apparel: Who
Captures the Tariff Rent in the Presence of Preferential Market Access? 28
WORLD ECON. 63, 67 (2005). On the other hand, these states enjoyed dramatic
increases in their exports to the U.S. following AGOA’s enactment. Id.
77. See, e.g., Sangeeta Khorana, Do Trade Preferences Enhance Market
Access for Developing Countries’ Agricultural Products? Evidence from
Switzerland, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 1073 (2007) (discussing the impact of trade
preferences on the agriculture sector).
78. Keck & Low, supra note 60, at 158.
79. See, e.g., Bernard Hoekman & Susan Prowse, Economic Policy
Responses to Preference Erosion: From Trade as Aid to Aid for Trade 6 (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3721, 2005), available at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/
2005/09/19/000016406_20050919093149/Rendered/PDF/wps3721.pdf. (“In the
case of market power, the result is a simple redistribution of the benefits of
preferences: rents are transferred to importers.”); Olarreaga & Özden, supra
note 76.
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developments since 1960. Firstly, there is little doubt that
developing states, especially those in East Asia, which were
granted the fewest preferences experienced the greatest
growth. Conversely, states granted the most preferences, like
those of sub-Saharan Africa, have not significantly diversified
their exports or substantially increased their per capita income
despite being.80More broadly, many of the empirical studies
that calculate the aggregate effects of preference programs
suggest that that they have produced at best a “modest”
increase in beneficiary state exports, with some of these gains
resulting from trade diversion, rather than trade creation.81
Somewhat counterintuitively, a number of more recent
empirical studies find that GSP is associated with negative
economic effects. For example, Özden and Reinhardt find that
participating in the U.S. GSP is not associated with an increase
in trade.82 A more recent study found that in the absence of
GATT/WTO membership or a PTA, preference programs
increase trade between states by 41%; however, if states have
one of these other trade relationships, then the granting of
preferences appears to benefit the importing state and harm
the exporting state.83 Similar counterintuitive results were
80. Joseph Francois, Bernard Hoekman, & Miriam Manchin, Preference
Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization, 20 WORLD BANK ECON. REV.
197, 197–198 (2006).
81. See generally André Sapir & Lars Lundberg, The U.S. Generalized
System of Preferences and Its Impacts, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF
RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 195 (Robert E. Baldwin & Anne O. Krueger eds.,
1984) (examining the complexities of GSP effects on beneficiary countries);
Craig R. MacPhee & Victor Iwuagwu Oguledo, The Trade Effects of the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences, 19 ATLANTIC ECON. J., Dec. 1991, at 19
(examining the weak impact of the U.S. GSP on LDCs); Drusilla K. Brown,
Trade and Welfare Effects of the European Schemes of the Generalized System
of Preferences, 37 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 757 (1989) (examining
GSP effects on importers and exporters); Ingo Borchert, Trade Diversion
Under Selective Preferential Market Access, 42 CANADIAN J. ECON. 1390 (2009)
(examining the European Community’s GSP program and its “trade-distorting
effects”); John Whalley, Non-Discriminatory Discrimination: Special and
Differential Treatment Under GATT for Developing Countries, 100 ECON. J.
1318 (1990) (examining the effects of special and differential treatment on
trade performance).
82. Çalgar Özden & Eric Reinhardt, The Perversity of Preferences: GSP
and Developing Country Trade Policies, 1976–2000, 78 J. DEV. ECON 1, 2
(2005).
83. Judith L. Goldstein, Douglas Rivers & Michael Tomz, Institutions in
International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO
on World Trade, 61 INT’L ORG. Winter 2007 at 37, 63. The authors
characterize this finding as “implausible” and as a “mystery left to be solved.”
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reached in a recent study using quite different data and
econometric techniques.84 Hence, the general consensus is that
the economic effects of preference programs have been, at best,
disappointing; a more pessimistic account concluded that
“[b]eyond some relative success stories, the picture is dismal.”85
To be sure, the empirical studies summarized above should
not be understood as conclusive arguments against the utility
of preference programs. First, empirically identifying the
effects of preferences is extraordinarily difficult, as researchers
must attempt to separate out the specific impacts of preference
programs from multiple other factors.86 In addition, the studies
do not always carefully separate the effects of different
preference programs; for example, studies that focus the effect
of GSP programs may be seriously misleading, as over time
some of these programs have been supplemented by a variety of
other programs that afford more preferential treatment, such
as CBI, AGOA and EBA.87 And the fact that the benefits of
preferential programs are narrowly concentrated may be less a
criticism of the design of these programs than a reflection of
how comparative advantage operates in a globalized economy,
given the fragmentation of global production chains.88 Finally,
it bears repeating that the literature here is vast, and no
consensus on the effects of preferences emerges. While a
majority of published studies suggest that preferences have
limited—or even negative—economic effects, other studies,
84. See, e.g., Bernhard Herz & Marco Wagner, Do the World Trade
Organization and the Generalized System of Preferences Foster Bilateral
Trade? 10 (Universität Bayreuth, Diskussionpapier 01–07, 2007) (“We find a
significantly negative effect of the Generalized System of Preferences of
around -16% on bilateral trade . . . .”).
85. UNCTAD, supra note 73, at X.
86. For example, it is difficult for empirical analysis to address the socalled endogeneity effect. Imagine that the United States extended
preferential tariff treatment to goods from a particular developing state just as
that state was emerging from a protracted civil war. It would be quite difficult
empirically to determine how much of a hypothetical boost in exports would be
related to reduced tariffs and how much to the end of the fighting.
87. For example, a more useful, albeit more complex, approach is to look
at the size, utilization and value of all non-reciprocal trade preference
programs. For one such effort, see Judith M. Dean & John Wainio,
Quantifying the Value of U.S. Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries, in
TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION: MEASUREMENT AND POLICY RESPONSE 29
(Bernard Hoeckman, Will Martin, Carlos A. Primo Braga eds., 2009).
88. See, e.g., Anthony Venables, Rethinking Economic Growth in a
Globalizing World: An Economic Geography Lens, in URBANIZATION AND
GROWTH 47, 51 (Michael Spence, Patricia Clarke Annez & Robert M. Buckley
eds., 2008) (discussing fragmentation as a part of the globalization process).
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using different assumptions and methodologies, find more
positive results.89
Perhaps most importantly, the relatively disappointing
economic results of preference programs to date can be
understood more as an argument for their reform than as an
argument for their elimination. That is, the econometric
analysis summarized above can be understood as a powerful
critique of preference programs as they are currently designed
and implemented, as opposed to a critique of their underlying
logic or purpose. Empirical research suggests that liberalizing
product coverage and rules of origin, for example, can
substantially increase developing state exports.90 Similarly,
where preferences are stable and secure, trade and investment
have increased.91 Moreover, recent scholarship suggests a
number of ways that preference programs can be reformed to
provide greater economic benefits to developing states.92
B. A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
As noted above, Developing Countries does not attempt to
review or analyze the substantial empirical literature on
preferences. Nevertheless, Hudec’s conclusions are broadly
consistent with those reached in the empirical literature:
89. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER STEVENS & JANE KENNAN, COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF G8 PREFERENTIAL ACCESS SCHEMES FOR AFRICA: REPORT ON A
DFID-COMMISSIONED STUDY 125 (2004) (providing a study of preferential
schemes and finding that “the system works . . . .”); Garth Frazer & Johannes
Van Biesebroeck, Trade Growth under the African Growth and Opportunity
Act 2 (Univ. of Toronto Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 289, 2007) (finding that
AGAO has had “a large and robust impact” on African exports to the U.S.).
90. Paul Collier & Anthony J. Venables, Rethinking Trade Preferences:
How Africa Can Diversify its Exports, 14 WORLD ECON: GLOBAL TRADE POL’Y
2007 137, 145–152 (David Greenway ed., 2007) (discussing increase in exports
from Africa to the U.S. when the U.S. liberalized rules of origin).
91. See Judith M. Dean, Do Preferential Trade Agreements Promote
Growth? An Evaluation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (USITC
Office of Econ., Working Paper No. 2002–07–A, 2002) (finding the CBERA has
trade-induced-investment effects).
92. For recent and thoughtful efforts to prompt a debate over reform along
these lines, see PETER KLEEN & SHELIA PAGE, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
(2005) available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2445.pdf; T.
Edemola Oyejide, Special and Differential Treatment, in DEVELOPMENT,
TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 504 (Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo,
& Philip English eds., 2002); Claire Melamed, Doing”Development” at the
World Trade Organization: The Doha Round and Special and Differential
Treatment, INST. DEV. STUD. BULL. April 2003, at 12; Keck & Low, supra note
60.
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preferential treatment can be expected to provide, at best,
marginal benefits to developing states, and may be
counterproductive, particularly for developing states that wish
to open their economies to the benefits of global trade.93
Hudec’s skepticism about preferences is rooted in his
understanding of the “practical realities” of GATT’s impact on
domestic policy-making.94 Hudec explains that trade
liberalization hurts some firms and individuals, and that these
actors will generate a “normal, permanent and quite vigorous”
opposition to trade liberalization.95 Hence, governments will
inevitably confront a “built-in political opposition to liberal
trade policy.”96 This opposition to liberalization will be in more
or less continuous conflict with the various forces that favor
increased openness to trade, including parties with direct
interests in lowering trade barriers, such as importers and
consumers; those with more diffuse interests in the general
conditions of international trade, such as financial
intermediaries and foreign investors; and those committed to
liberal economic policies for economic or political reasons.97
Hudec argues that the role of GATT obligations is to
“augment the political power” of the broad, albeit diffuse, set of
domestic interests that support trade liberalization.98 The trade
system does so by providing legal and policy arguments to
government officials and others who seek to overcome the
inevitable forces of protectionism99 and by helping to mobilize
93. In this respect, Developing Countries can be located within a larger
literature that elaborates various critiques of preferential treatment that have
been raised repeatedly in the policy literature. See, e.g., HARRY G. JOHNSON,
ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1967); Gardner
Patterson, Would Tariff Preferences Help Economic Development?, 76 LLOYDS
BANK REV. 18 (1965) (discussing the case for as well as against preferences
and concluding that the costs may outweigh the benefits). For an influential
contemporaneous report setting out the case in favor of preferences, see also
U.N. Secretary-General, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development, Report
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.46/3 (1964), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N64/039/90/PDF/N6403990.pdf?OpenElement.
94. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 116 (“[T]he dynamics of policies based on
discrimination make it likely that preferential legal structures will eventually
cause government to do more harm than good to the supposed beneficiaries of
such discrimination.”).
95. Id. at 140.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 141.
98. Id.
99. Hudec identifies four specific ways that GATT/WTO legal obligations
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export-oriented groups to countervail the influence of importsensitive constituencies. Thus Hudec employs, without using
the terms, a “liberal” understanding of the determinants of
state policy and a “second image reversed” model of how
international law can empower or disempower various domestic
constituencies.100
How do preferences change the political dynamics in
developing states? Preference programs provide developing
state exports with preferential access to developed state
markets, without developing states having to “pay” for this
increased access through tariff reductions.101 This alters the
political dynamic in developing states, as export interests will
now have little incentive to lobby their governments to reduce
tariffs. Hence, although protectionist interests will continue to
lobby developing state governments, these governments will
experience reduced pressure from those that favor liberal
policies. These governments will therefore face fewer incentives
to liberalize and will be more likely to pursue protectionist
policies. As a result, Hudec concludes that developed state
preference programs can “provid[e] no assistance [to the
liberalization project] and [are] probably an active political
impediment.”102
can do so: (i) The desire to honor international obligations can be sufficient to
drive government positions, as governments seek to avoid unlawful policies
that can produce “unpleasant and damaging public controversy;” (ii)
International obligations provide a useful public justification for decisions
taken on other, including less popular, reasons; (iii) International legal norms
“are a concise way of defining policy for government officials;” and (iv)
International obligations signal to the public not to expect or rely upon tradedistorting measures. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 141–142.
100. For more on liberal theories of international law and international
relations, see Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal
Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513 (1997); Anne-Marie
Slaughter & Jose E. Alvarez, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. 240 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International
Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 717 (1995). For more on second image reversed theories of international
law and international relations, see Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image
Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics, 32 INT’L ORG. 881
(1978); see also INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Robert O.
Keohane & Helen V. Milner eds., 1996); Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The
Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT’L ORG. 363 (2005). For a recent
effort to apply second-image reversed theory to decisions to comply with
international legal norms, see Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and
Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with
International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 127 (2010).
101. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 142 (discussing the reciprocity doctrine).
102. Id. at 147.
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For developing states that wish to pursue interventionist
policies on the grounds that under certain circumstances these
policies enhance economic welfare,103 the picture is a bit more
nuanced. Here, in principle, a policy of non-reciprocity may be
desirable, as greater freedom from GATT disciplines can
produce economic gains. The problem is in distinguishing the
economically useful forms of government intervention from
those that are welfare-reducing.
Given the predictable pressures from protectionist
interests, and his dim view of state capabilities, Hudec doubts
the ability of developing state governments to appropriately
draw this distinction.104 Hudec argues that “developing-country
governments following active interventionist policies are going
to need all the outside help they can get in order to contain
[protectionist] forces”—and that GATT disciplines are one
potentially important source of help.105 Hence, Hudec concludes
that whether a developing state government wishes to pursue a
liberal or an interventionist economic policy, preferences
disserve developing state interests.
IV. THEORIZING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
All works discussing state behavior necessarily, even if
only implicitly, adopt methodological orientations towards and
theoretical assumptions regarding the nature of states, the
103. Hudec reviews the circumstances under which interventionist policies
may be welfare enhancing, including in the nurturing of infant industries. Id.
at 127–32.
104. Id. at 144–48. On the other hand, developing states often claim that
they are in the best position to decide whether and when to adopt
interventionist policies and should be able to do so free of GATT disciplines.
They also claim that since some interventions are economically useful, a
presumption that pro-export lobbies should prevail over import-sensitive
lobbies in developing state domestic politics is unwarranted. Developing states
would presumably reject Hudec’s likely response—that liberalized markets are
more likely to produce economic growth—as inconsistent with their
experience. Some empirical research undertaken after the original publication
of Developing Countries lends support to Hudec’s argument. See, e.g., Bernard
Hoekman et al., Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in
the WTO: Moving Forward after Cancún, 27 WORLD ECON. 481 (2004);
Sanjaya Lall, Selective Policies for Export Promotion: Lessons from the Asian
Tigers, in NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORT PROMOTION IN AFRICA: EXPERIENCE AND
ISSUES 23 (G.K. Helleiner ed., 2002); Arvind Panagariya, Evaluating the Case
for Export Subsidies, (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No.
2276, 2000).
I am grateful to Frank Garcia for highlighting these arguments.
105. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 149.
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factors that motivate them, and the incentives and constraints
that the international system imposes upon them. Developing
Countries is no exception and, having summarized Developing
Countries’ arguments, it is useful to review the text’s
methodological commitments. As noted above, the book opens
with a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the historical
debate over whether developing state goods should receive
preferential treatment. Hudec’s historical narrative reads, for
the most part, as a straightforward realist account of
international trade relations.106 Thus, Hudec focuses on states
that pursue what they understand to be their political and
economic interests in the international trade regime. To do so,
states exercise diplomatic and economic leverage, with the
resulting agreements reflecting a compromise among
conflicting national interests. 107
Developing Countries’ second part, which engages in a
political economy analysis, has a strikingly different theoretical
and methodological orientation. Here, the focus turns from
relations among states to interactions among interest groups
and bureaucracies within states. However, Hudec’s analysis
moves well beyond the familiar public choice insight that, due
to collective action problems, well-organized special interests
can capture domestic law-making processes.108 Instead, Hudec
devotes substantial attention to the ways that international
legal norms can empower or disempower various domestic
constituencies and hence impact domestic politics.
At first glance, one might be inclined to argue that the
106. For an analysis that adopts a similar methodological approach, but
that disaggregates developing state positions with regard to preferences, see
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Political Geography of Distributive Justice, in
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (Chi Carmody, et
al. eds., forthcoming).
107. To be sure, Hudec’s account is more nuanced than this necessarily
brief summary may suggest. Thus, for example, he recognizes the influence of
ideas on international relations, e.g., HUDEC, supra note 1, at 65–67
(explaining that developed states underestimate the power and significance of
non-binding principles and that international law can play an important
constraining role in international relations.) However, for the most part, the
historical account in part I of Developing Countries focuses on states and their
interests. Hudec’s focus upon state pursuit of national interest finds parallels
in Jose Alvarez’s contribution to this issue. See Jose Alvarez, The Return of the
State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming, Summer 2011).
108. For a general introduction to public choice theories, see PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Farber, ed. 2007); DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(1991).
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methodological and theoretical orientations of the first part of
Developing Countries are in unacknowledged tension with the
theoretical approaches employed in the second part of the text
and that this tension represents an inconsistency in the
author’s analysis. However, in the work of talented authors
such as Hudec, such theoretical tensions often lead to the very
center of their work, and provide clues toward understanding
the problems Hudec is addressing. In short, the relationship
between the different parts of the text are less a methodological
flaw than a roadmap that points us toward the possibilities and
limits of Hudec’s project.
For current purposes, it is more fruitful to understand the
diverse methodological frameworks used in different parts of
the book as resting upon an even more foundational
assumption that animates the entire text, namely Hudec’s
rather bleak opinion of political actors and political
institutions. Indeed, the inconclusive nature of the negotiations
over preferential treatment and the disappointing, if not
counterproductive, effects of preferential policies are entirely
consistent with the larger narrative that informs Developing
Countries. As explained more fully below, it is only a slight
exaggeration to characterize the book’s overarching images of
the trade system, and the political actors representing states
that comprise it, as marked by contradiction and hypocrisy.
A. HUDEC’S DARK VISION
Virtually every actor and every policy that comes under
Hudec’s discriminating gaze is seen as, at best, ineffective, and
at worst, counterproductive. Domestic governments are
repeatedly pictured as weak and hypocritical. For example, the
original U.S. position in post-war trade negotiations was “full of
internal contradictions,” because at the same time as it argued
against preferences and for non-discrimination as a matter of
principle, it insisted on trade-distorting exceptions for itself,
such as the ability to impose quotas on agricultural imports.109
Hudec claims that continued U.S. support for these and other
exceptions is a “contradiction” that has been “a constant in
GATT’s legal history and is as true today as it was in 1947.”110
To be sure, the U.S. is not the only actor Hudec critiques.
Hudec claims that developed state critiques of illiberal
109. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 34. The history behind the GATT’s treatment
of agriculture is explored in BROWN, supra note 73, at 22–28, 51–54.
110. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 34.
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developing state trade policies are a “sham,” and he
provocatively argues that “many developed countries are really
quite happy with the absence of legal discipline over developing
countries because it gives them an excuse for the illegal trade
barriers they themselves are imposing.”111 He colorfully
describes many of the ways that developed state governments
mask the “inadequacy of the[ir] performance” in the realm of
trade policy, including through their ability to “rearrang[e] the
numbers until they provide maximum trade gains.”112
Developing states, as well, seek the “easy way out” and try “to
satisfy as many domestic political interests as possible,” even if
such policies impose welfare costs on the state’s population.113
Multilateral efforts fare little better in Hudec’s view. As
noted above, Developing Countries details nearly a half-century
of international negotiations that prove unable to resolve
underlying tensions over preference programs. And, although
the trading nations are unable to reach substantive agreement,
they can and do repeatedly agree to generate many formal
declarations and decisions that, in Hudec’s opinion, represent
nothing more than legal form without substance. Hudec is
scornful of the enormous amount of energy and attention
devoted to GATT’s negotiations, never-ending meetings and
useless bureaucratic squabbling, characterizing these efforts as
“tedious, repetitive and often, absurd.”114
At one point, Hudec goes so far as to suggest that the
entire enterprise of creating a multilateral body designed to
ensure the smooth functioning of international markets is
potentially self-defeating.115 Hudec perceptively notes the
paradox inherent in constructing an international trade regime
along the lines of the GATT:
It is possible that the design of the [international trade system] . . .
may itself have encouraged preference for market-distorting
solutions. The [trade regime] represented a new idea in international
economic affairs – the idea that the governments of the world, by
acting together in concerted rule-making activity, could shape the
international trade environment in which their economies would
operate. Although the sponsors of this ‘architectonic’ enterprise were
actually seeking to diminish government activity in the market place,
111. Id. at 121.
112. Id. at 143.
113. Id. at 190.
114. Id. at 55.
115. HUDEC, supra note 1, at 187 (“It is very difficult to imagine that any
multilateral legal instrument, backed by a multilateral institution, could ever
be negotiated.”).
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rule-making institutions tend to encourage just the opposite instincts
– the urge to improve on nature by writing rules about how it should
function. The existence of the institution tends to affirm the efficacy
of the work it does.116

For current purposes, it is not necessary to determine
whether the “realist” orientation Hudec adopts in the first part
of Developing Countries is entirely consistent with, or more or
less descriptively accurate than, the “liberal” approach
employed in the second part of the book, or whether his dark
view of state actors is exaggerated or accurate. Rather, the goal
here is to unmask the implications of Hudec’s methodological
commitments, to juxtapose them with the tools of the
econometric analysis discussed above, and to examine whether
and how a research agenda that borrows from or employs both
methodologies might enrich our understanding of preferences
and their effects upon developing states. I turn to this task
below.
B. ADVANCING THE DEBATE OVER THE EFFECTS OF
PREFERENCES
Hudec’s emphasis on political economy and dark vision of
politics and institutions, combined with the empirical research
summarized above, suggest the outlines of a progressive
research agenda.117 What insights might be gained by
juxtaposing Developing Countries’ dark vision of politics with
116. Id. at 31. Ironically, the only entities that do not appear to engage in
counterproductive and self-defeating behavior are the protectionist interests
who are able to successfully pursue policies that advance their interests while
disserving the interests of their fellow citizens. In contrast to the other actors
that appear in Developing Countries, these rent-seeking interests seem wellorganized, purposive, and all-too-successful. Of course, given the problems
that plague decision-making in all other institutions, it is not clear why rentseeking firms and industries will not also, at times, pursue counterproductive
strategies. Nor does Hudec address why, even if protectionist interests
attempt to pursue their interests in a rational manner, they will not suffer
from incomplete information and bounded rationality, or from problems of
corruption, fraud, and malfeasance, like other institutions.
117. By “progressive” I do not mean to suggest a particular political
orientation but rather a research methodology that seeks to generate
predictions, and then prove or disprove these predictions with data, to
generate a coherent research agenda. For more the idea of a progressive
research agenda, see IMRE LAKATOS, THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH PROGRAMMES (John Worrall & Gregory Currie eds., 1978); Imre
Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 91
(Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970).
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the econometric research exploring the empirical effect of
preferential trade polices? Can utilizing political economy and
econometric analysis reveal any hidden costs—or benefits—
associated with the enactment and administration of
preferential tariff policies?
A full exploration of these questions is well beyond the
scope of this article. However, by way of example, I sketch out
below three lines of inquiry that may reveal important and
underappreciated effects of preferential trade policies. Utilizing
both political economy and econometric analysis could shed
light on:
(i) whether the proliferation of preferential tariff programs
produces greater protectionism in developing states and, if so,
whether preference programs can be refined to avoid this
result;
(ii) whether the proliferation of preferential tariff programs
has contributed to the dramatic increase in the number of
bilateral and regional trade agreements and, if so, whether
these agreements promote or hinder developing state interests;
(iii) whether the debate over preferences has served, in
part, to divert attention from policies more likely to promote
developing state growth and, if so, whether the trade regime
can encourage developing states to pursue more successful
economic policies.
1. Do preference programs reinforce protectionism in
developing states?
As noted above, on political economy grounds Hudec
argues that preferences are unlikely to assist developing state
governments that wish to pursue liberalized trade policies. This
claim should be empirically testable. An influential 2005 study
by Özden and Reinhardt examined 154 developing states and
found that states dropped from the United States’s GSP
program subsequently adopted lower trade barriers than those
states that remained eligible for the program.118 This result is
entirely consistent with Developing Countries’ argument.
Hudec suggests that developing states’ ability to enjoy
preferential access to developed state markets will reduce the
incentives that beneficiary state exporters have to lobby for

118. Özden & Reinhardt, supra note 54, at 1.

DUNOFF - Final Version

2011]

4/22/2011 6:16 PM

HUDEC’S METHODS—AND OURS

465

trade liberalization.119 As a result, the policy process will be
dominated by import-sensitive groups, and governments will be
more likely to respond to their pleas.
This apparent confirmation of Hudec’s insight by empirical
research suggests several areas of further inquiry. For
example, the Özden and Reinhardt study examines only states
that participate in the U.S. GSP program. Additional studies
could examine the effects of participation in various other
preference programs to determine whether some have greater
effects on beneficiary states than others; similarly, as
preference programs differ in their details, it may be fruitful to
examine how different types of programs influence the balance
between protectionist and liberalizing forces within beneficiary
states.
Moreover, the Özden and Reinhardt study examines
available data on aggregate trade openness;120 future studies
might focus less on degrees of openness and more on levels of
economic performance. Is being a beneficiary of developed state
preference programs associated with increased GDP or greater
levels of foreign investment? Or with improved quality of life
indicators?121 Perhaps more importantly, future studies should
attempt to identify the actual political economy mechanisms
that produce the effects Özden and Reinhardt identify. These
studies might suggest ways to fine-tune preference programs to
avoid the “perverse” effects they seem to have on developing
states.
A related topic of great importance involves the effects of
preference programs that include various forms of
conditionality. For example, following the Appellate Body
report in the GSP dispute, the European Union revised its GSP
program.122 The new program extends additional tariff
119. See generally HUDEC, supra note 1, at 176–79 (arguing against
preferential treatment policies).
120. Özden & Reinhardt, supra note 54, at 9.
121. This approach to development is reflected in, for example, the UNDP’s
annual Human Development Report. See Human Development Reports,
UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). This
approach is associated with the writings of Amartya Sen and Martha
Nussbaum. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000); AMARTYA SEN,
DEMOCRACY AS FREEDOM (1999).
122. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr.
7, 2004). For an analysis of this decision, see Dunoff, supra note 64; Gregory
Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the Generalized System of
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preferences to developing states that commit to ratify and
implement a number of human rights and good governance
conventions.123 U.S. preference programs similarly condition
certain preferences on various types of domestic reforms in
beneficiary states, particularly by requiring that workers’
rights be protected. As discussed below, an emerging school of
thought argues that increased respect for rule of law, human
rights, labor rights, and so forth is important determinants of
economic performance. Moreover, the comparative politics
literature has long debated the political institutional
determinants of liberal trade policy.124 The existence of
multiple preference programs that require different types of
domestic reforms offer a valuable means to test the hypotheses
developed in these literatures.
Finally, it should be possible empirically to investigate
whether PTAs or unilateral preference programs produce
greater changes in the human rights and related practices of
target states. An emerging literature argues that PTAs can be
more effective than human rights treaties at changing the
human rights behavior of repressive states.125 Professor
Hafner-Burton, perhaps the most prominent voice in this camp,
argues that international instruments designed to influence
human rights practices need legally enforceable, binding
obligations to be successful.126 Using cross-national analysis
over several decades, she purports to demonstrate that PTAs
with hard standards and effective enforcement often induce
greater protection of human rights. Hence, she argues, PTAs
can be more effective at changing repressive state practice the
Preferences Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law
and the Politics of Rights, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 977 (2005).
123. Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005, Applying a Scheme of Generalised
Tariff Preferences, 2005 O.J. (L169/1).
124. See, e.g., Sean Erlich, Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and
Trade Policy in Democracies, 61 INT’L ORG. 571 (2007); Witold J. Henisz &
Edward D. Mansfield, Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of
Commercial Openness, 50 INT’L STUDIES Q. 189 (2006); Helen V. Milner &
Keiko Kubota, Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in
the Developing Countries, 59 INT’L ORG. 107 (2005); Gene M. Grossman &
Elhanan Helpman, A Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics, 120 Q. J.
ECON. 1239 (2005); Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567 (1993).
125. See, e.g., EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, FORCED TO BE GOOD: WHY
TRADE AGREEMENTS BOOST HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton,
Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence
Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593 (2005).
126. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights, supra note 125, at 594–595.
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human rights practices of repressive governments than human
rights agreements can be.127 Extending this work, it would be
useful to compare whether preferential arrangements have a
similar effect on human rights policies; whether ‘positive’ or
‘negative’ incentives have a greater impact; and how the design
of conditionality clauses changes their effects.
2. Do preference programs contribute to an increase in the
number of preferential trade agreements?
Trading nations have entered into a frenzy of bilateral and
regional trade agreements in recent years; indeed, more
preferential trade agreements were created during the WTO’s
first decade than during GATT’s five decades. Moreover, unlike
in the past, many recent bilateral and regional free trade
agreements have been between developed and developing
countries. Although a growing literature attempts to explain
the causes and consequences of the proliferation of preferential
trade agreements (PTAs),128 virtually no empirical scholarship
examines whether there is a causal link between the creation of
preferential trade programs and the rise in preferential trade
agreements.129
A causal relationship is quite plausible, particularly if one
adopts the realist perspective Hudec uses in the first part of
Developing Countries, where states are concerned about
relative gains. As noted above, preferential trade programs are
inherently unstable in several respects. For example, developed
states have broad discretion to add or subtract countries and
goods from their preference programs.130 Plus, as developing
127. Id. at 597.
128. See, e.g., Jayant Menon, Dealing with the Proliferation of Bilateral
Free Trade Agreements, 32 WORLD ECON. 1381 (2009); John Whalley, Recent
Regional Agreements: Why So Many, Why So Much Variance in Form, Why
Coming So Fast, and Where Are They Headed?, 31 WORLD ECON. 517 (2008);
Roberto V. Fiorentino et al., The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade
Agreements: 2006 Update, WTO DISCUSSION PAPER NO 12 (2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/disc_paper12_e.htm.
129. The terminology for these trade agreements can be confusing. For
current purposes, I wish to contrast the WTO agreements, on the one hand,
and all bilateral, regional and plurilateral trade agreements of a preferential
nature, on the other hand. The traditional umbrella term used for this latter
group of agreements is “regional trade agreements.” However, increasingly
these agreements are entered into by states that are not geographic neighbors.
Hence, I will usually refer to these agreements as preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) rather than use the traditional term of regional trade
agreements.
130. See, e.g., Sunburst Farms Inc.v. U.S., 620 F. Supp. 735, 735 (CIT
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states grow their economies and become more effective
exporters, they are “graduated” from preference programs. To
address the instability and uncertainties associated with GSP
programs, developing states might seek to enter into PTAs with
developed states. The rationale for doing so would be relatively
straightforward: in contrast to preference programs which exist
and can be changed at the discretion of developed states, PTAs
are reciprocal agreements governed by international law and
cannot be unilaterally changed.
This relatively simple hypothesis suggests a rich research
agenda. For example, empirical research could attempt to
identify the factors that induce developing states to enter into
trade agreements with developed states. Might developing
states fear the loss of preferential access to developed state
markets, for example, by being excluded from GSP and related
programs? Do developing states seek PTAs when they see
developed states negotiating PTAs with other developing
countries, or when competitors obtain preferential market
access? In short, do developing states use PTAs an insurance
policy against being placed at a competitive disadvantage
through discriminatory policies?
This potential link between preference programs and PTAs
is important, because there is substantial evidence that the rise
of PTAs may disserve developing state interests. First, recent
experience suggests that, in practice, many of the problems
associated with preference programs – such as trade diversion,
product exclusions, and complex rules of origin – are largely
replicated in PTAs.131 Moreover, many PTAs are very broad in
scope. Notably, in recent years the inclusion of issues beyond
the WTO’s ambit has been especially marked in PTAs among
developed and developing economies.132 For example, at the
2004 WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, developing states
were able to exclude the so-called “Singapore Issues” of trade
1985); Florsheim Shoe Co. v. U. S., 744 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
131. See generally Report by the Consultative Board to the Director—
General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing
Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium, WTO (2004) (“examin[ing] the
functioning of the institution – the WTO – and consider[ing] how well it is
equipped to carry the weight of future.”).
132. See, e.g., World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade,
Regionalism and Development (2005) (discussing “the characteristics of
agreements that strongly promote—or hinder—development for member
countries?” and whether “the proliferation of agreements pose[s] risks to the
multilateral trading system, and how those risks can be managed?”).
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facilitation, investment, government procurement and
competition from the negotiating agenda. However, these
issues are addressed in many recent PTAs between developing
and developed country partners.133 Similarly, the United States
is able to address issues that developing states can keep out of
WTO negotiations, like labor and environment, in its PTAs
with developing states.
Finally, there is substantial evidence that developed states’
ability to address WTO-plus issues in PTAs with developing
states has reduced developed states’ willingness to reduce
tariffs on a multilateral basis. For example, empirical research
suggests that both EU and U.S. reductions in MFN tariffs for
PTA products during the Uruguay Round were on average only
about one-half of the reduction for similar products that did not
receive preferences.134 To the extent that U.S. and EU
preference programs require cooperation in labor, environment,
drug enforcement, immigration and other issues, we might
understand the extension of preferential trade access as
payment by developed states to developing states for
cooperation. This implies “that a reduction in MFN tariffs that
lowers the preferential margin will be resisted by both the
country that receives preferences and the country that grants
them;”135 more broadly, it implies that the current round of
PTAs between developing and developed states may serve as
stumbling blocks, rather than building blocks, to multilateral
liberalization.136 And substantial research suggests that
133. Examples of PTAs between developed and developing countries
including all or some of the Singapore issues include: EC-South Africa, EFTAChile, United States–Morocco, United States-Jordan, and Thailand-Australia.
134. Nuno Limão, Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for
Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the US., 96 AM. ECON. REV.
896, 903–910 (2006); Baybars Karacaovali & Nuno Limão, The Clash of
Liberalizations: Preferential versus Multilateral Trade Liberalization in the
European Union 18–26 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
3493, 2005) (“analyz[ing] the effects of [preferential trade agreements] on
multilateral trade liberalization. . .”).
135. Nuno Limão & Marcelo Olarreaga, Trade Preferences to Small
Developing Countries and the Welfare Costs of Lost Multilateral Liberalization,
20 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 217, 219 (2006).
136. Richard E. Baldwin & Elena Seghezza, Are Trade Blocs Building or
Stumbling Blocs?, 25 J. ECON. INTEG. 276, 276 (2010); Philippe Aghion, et al.,
Negotiating Free Trade, 73 J. INT’L ECON 1, 2 (2007); Caroline Freund,
Multilateralism and the Endogenous Formation of Preferential Trade
Agreements, 52 J. INT’L ECON. 359 (2000) (“examin[ing] the interaction
between preferential trade agreements and multilateral tariff reduction in a
model of imperfect competition”).
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multilateral liberalization would benefit developing states more
than preferential liberalization.137
These arguments point towards a series of substantial,
albeit indirect, hidden costs associated with preference
programs. However, there are a number of claims embedded in
these arguments that would benefit from empirical research.
For example, the studies cited above examine the effect of PTAs
on U.S. and EU tariff rates; future studies could extend this
inquiry to other states that grant preferences, such as
Australia or Japan, to see if similar results obtain. Moreover,
the studies cited above focus on tariffs; future studies could
explore whether PTAs affect market access through non-tariff
barriers.
In addition, future research could address related lines of
inquiry. For example, how do PTAs affect states that are not
part of the PTA? If, as suggested above, the EU liberalizes less
on an MFN basis because of its PTAs, might that lead, say, the
EU’s negotiating partners to reciprocate by offering fewer
concessions than they would otherwise be willing to?138 If so,
that would mean that the increase in the number of PTAs
might generate important adverse spillover effects on nonparties.
Questions like these can be investigated using econometric
analysis. However, even if econometric studies reveal various
indirect effects of preferences, these studies would ultimately
call for a political economy explanation for precisely how PTAs
effect multilateral liberalization. Hence, inquiries like these are
illustrative of how econometric and political economy
explanations can be mutually reinforcing and can illuminate
the underexplored relationship between preference programs
and PTAs.
3. Is the debate over preferences a diversion?
Finally, there is an important issue that Developing
Countries does not explicitly address: the possible diversionary
effect of the debate over preferences itself. As the first part of
Developing Countries illustrates, developing state demands “for
137. Glenn Harrison et al., Rules of Thumb for Evaluating Preferential
Trading Arrangements: Evidence from Computable General Equilibrium
Assessments, 40 CUADERNOS DE ECONOMÍA 460, at 3 (2003) available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/harrisontarr.pdf.
138. Nuno Limão, Preferential vs. Multilateral Trade Liberalization:
Evidence and Open Questions, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 155, 171 (2006).
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greater market access [became] the first issue on the agenda”
during the GATT’s early years,139 and has remained at or near
the center of the international trade agenda ever since. The
contrast between the political salience of preferences and their
disappointing economic results raises an intriguing puzzle: if
preferential treatment generates limited economic benefits –
and renders the pursuit of effective economic policies more
difficult—why do developing states continue to advocate for
these programs?
Perhaps another of Hudec’s observations in Developing
Countries may shed light on this puzzle. Despite—or perhaps
because of—his deep engagement with the trade system, Hudec
was acutely aware of the limits of trade law and policy. Hudec
emphasizes that the economic performance of a developing
state is influenced more by its domestic policies than by
developed state trade policy; he writes that “a government’s
own trade-policy decisions are the most important determinant
of its own economic welfare.”140 Recent empirical studies lend
support the claim that export performance correlates with
economic reforms in the exporting country.141 This claim fits
into a larger literature—mostly produced after Developing
Countries was first published—arguing that access to rich
country markets is a necessary but far from sufficient condition
for development, and that various features of the domestic
domain such as meaningful political representation, individual
liberties, independent judiciaries, the rule of law, and other
aspects of institutional and legal infrastructure are critical
determinants of domestic growth.142 This research suggests
139. Hudec, supra note 1, at 53.
140. Id. at 139.
141. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The
African Growth and Opportunity Act: A Preliminary Assessment, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/1 (2003) (offer[ing] an early assessment of the
utility of the AGOA tariff preferences as an instrument of special and
differential (S&D) treatment for the beneficiary countries.”).
142. An influential body of political economy scholarship focuses upon
domestic institutions. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik et al., Institutions Rule: The
Primary of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic
Development, 9 J ECON. GROWTH 131 (2004) (“estimate[ing] the respective
contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income
levels around the world”); Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV.
1369(2001) (examining “differences in European mortality rates to estimate
the effect of institutions on economic performance”); Robert Hall & Charles
Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker
than Others, 114 Q. J. ECON. 83(1999) (“show[ing] that differences in physical
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that the primary responsibility for the disappointing economic
performance of many developing states reflects domestic
constraints—including limited supply side capacity, sub-par
infrastructure, and underdeveloped political and legal
institutions—rather than developed state trade policies.
Perhaps as a result, in the past few years much of the
dialogue at the WTO concerning developing states has shifted
from a focus on preferences to the so-called Aid-for-Trade
initiative. The key analytic move making this dialogue possible
is the widespread acknowledgment that developing states
continue to face significant supply-side capacity and
infrastructure constraints that inhibit their ability to expand
international trade. As a result, developing states, donor
nations, regional bodies and international organizations have
coalesced around an Aid for Trade mandate agreed to at the
WTO’s 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. Since then,
much attention has focused on the need to mainstream trade
into national development plans on the rationale that doing so
will help states mitigate potential adjustment costs and assists
developing states seize trade opportunities. Significantly,
funding for Aid for Trade activities more than doubled between
2005 and 2007, and has continued to increase even in the face
of the global economic crisis.
The emphasis of the Aid for Trade initiative has shifted
over time. During the early years—between the Hong Kong
Ministerial in 2005 and the First Global Review of Aid for
Trade in 2007—the focus was on raising awareness and
generating commitment
among
various stakeholders.
Thereafter, the focus has shifted to implementation and
monitoring. Implementation rests largely in the hands of
developing countries, in partnership with development
organizations and funders, including the World Bank and
regional
development
banks,
international
financial
organizations, and bilateral donors. A significant monitoring
capital and educational attainment can only partially explain the variation in
output per worker” and “document[ing] that the differences in capital
accumulation, productivity, and…output per worker are driven by differences
in institutions and government policies.”). Many of the arguments in this
literature regarding the importance of domestic institutions build upon the
pioneering work of Douglass North. See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990)
(discussing “an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which
institutions and institutional change affect performance of economies, both at
a given time and over time”).
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and evaluation effort is also underway, with the goal of
encouraging key actors to meet commitments and improving
the effectiveness of programs. The WTO and OECD joint
publication “Aid for Trade at a Glance” provides countryspecific fact sheets for nearly 90 different states.143 The WTO
has also engaged in analysis and advocacy to highlight the
needs of its members and to showcase effective
implementation.144 Although Aid-for-Trade is still in its early
stages, it represents a potentially significant shift in the debate
within the trade system regarding how to create structures so
that developing states can best exploit international trade
opportunities.The disappointing economic results from
preference programs and the shift of attention to Aid-for-Trade
programs raise the question of whether the lengthy and
contentious focus on preferences diverted diplomatic and
scholarly attention to an issue of decidedly secondary
importance and hence obscured more important issues related
to domestic reform in developing states.145 Ironically, although
much effort has been devoted to measuring the economic effects
of preferences, no scholarly attention has been paid to the
opportunity costs associated with this misdirection of
diplomatic and political efforts. But current knowledge
regarding successful development strategies raises the question
of whether this diversion of energies and attention represents a
hidden cost of the debate over preferences.
V. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ RHETORICAL STRATEGY
Developing Countries is justifiably considered a classic of
trade scholarship. However, in several important respects, the
text—ambitious as it is—sells itself short. For example,
Developing Countries presents itself as providing a
straightforward account of the tensions between developed and
143. Aid-for-Trade statistics can be found at Aid for Trade at a Glance
2009—Partner Country Information, OECD (Feb 21, 2011, 12:45 PM),
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3746,en_2649_34665_42926849_1_1_1_1,00.
html.
144. For a fuller description, see WTO, Aid-for-Trade Work Programme,
2010–2011, WT/COMTD/AFT/W/16 (Nov. 27, 2009) available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm.
145. To be sure, this literature does not exclude the possibility that the
relative importance of domestic policy exists precisely because existing
preference policies have been poorly designed and unevenly applied. See, e.g.,
Frank Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 291 (2004).calling for an agreement on preferential treatment
that is fair, clear and creates space for domestic policy.).
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developing states over preferential treatment, and offering a
pragmatic and realistic critique of then-current thinking about
trade policy. The book is relentlessly instrumental in tone and
approach, and can easily be taken as an example of Hudec’s oftnoted “realistic, functional, fact-focused and anti-conceptual
way of” thinking.146
And yet, of course, the book presupposes a rather complex
set of assumptions about the way the world works. Indeed, it
could hardly be otherwise. Any instrumental approach to
international law necessarily rests upon a series of
assumptions about the principal actors in the trade system,
these actors’ motivations and capacities, and the constraints
imposed by the international system itself.147
For example, Developing Countries implicitly utilizes an
extremely sophisticated vision of the role and limits of
international law, including international trade law. The text
includes important but underdeveloped insights about the
nature of international dispute resolution, an implicit theory of
the mechanisms that induce compliance with international
norms, and important observations regarding the function and
role of soft law.148 In brief, Developing Countries assumes a
146. David Palmeter, Robert E. Hudec—A Practitioner’s Appreciation, 37 J
WORLD TRADE 703, 705 (2003). See also Joel Trachtman, Robert Hudec and the
Vocation of International Trade Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 742, 743 (2003)
(“Hudec was impatient with most legal theory. . .”).
147. To be sure, instrumental approaches are not the only, or necessarily
the best, approaches to international law. International law, including
international trade law, can be understood as a deontological quest for justice.
See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELFDETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003)
(aiming “to develop the outlines of a coherent, systematic vision of an
international legal order that takes the protection of human rights seriously,
while anchoring that vision in moral reasoning that is informed both by a due
appreciation of the limitations of existing institutions and a willingness to
consider possibilities for institutional reform.”); FRANK GARCIA, TRADE,
INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE (2003)
(arguing that “international trade law does not exist outside of the realm of
justice. . .”).
148. Hudec explored many of these themes in a number of important
works, including Robert E. Hudec, Adjudication of International Trade
Disputes (Trade Policy Research Centre, Thames Essay No. 16, 1978); Robert
E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the DISC
Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1988); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1999); Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies
in WTO Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROCEDURES—ISSUES AND LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 345 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000) ; Robert
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rather complex account of the ways that international law does
and does not affect state behavior, and it is a text of enormous
theoretical interest and sophistication. As a result, Developing
Countries is a much richer and theoretically ambitious
undertaking than it lets on. Although it is refreshing to
encounter a text that does not try to oversell itself, it is worth
considering whether there are hidden costs to Hudec’s
undersell.
To approach this issue, it is useful to consider what has
changed in the two decades since Developing Countries first
appeared. The trade regime has, of course, seen substantial
institutional and doctrinal changes, including the creation of
the WTO, the expansion of trade disciplines into new areas
such as intellectual property and services, and the
establishment of the WTO’s strengthened dispute settlement
system. Moreover, when Developing Countries was first
released, the GATT was a relatively obscure institution.
Indeed, during its first several decades, the GATT operated as
a “club” where a relatively small number of diplomats and
economists from like-minded states worked quietly to make
trade policy without significant public input or oversight.149 In
short, when Hudec wrote Developing Countries, the trade
regime was practically unknown outside a small group of trade
cognoscenti, “globalization” had not yet entered the public
lexicon, and trade negotiations and agreements rarely captured
media or public attention.
International trade is no longer an obscure topic. Concerns
over globalization and outsourcing are prominent in public
debate and political campaigns, and trade is one of the most
important and highly developed fields of international law. The
WTO is a highly visible and controversial component of an
emerging regime of global economic governance. Moreover, the
current trade regime is no longer preoccupied with sleepy
topics like tariffs and quotas; instead it has become a central
E. Hudec, The Adequacy of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Developing
Country Perspective, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO (Bernard
Hoekman et al. eds., 2002).
149. Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, The Club Model of Multilateral
Cooperation and the World Trade Organization: Problems of Democratic
Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUALITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 264 (Roger Porter et al. eds., 2001). See
also J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats:
Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of Dispute Settlement, id.
at 334; Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy— and Back Again: The
Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94 (2002).
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battleground for contentious issues like developing state access
to affordable medicines and the locus of transnational conflicts
pitting trade against non-trade values.
Changes in the academic study of international trade have
been no less dramatic. Trade law was a marginalized and
relatively underdeveloped discipline when Developing
Countries was first issued. Trade law articles rarely appeared
in international law journals,150 let alone flagship general topic
law reviews,151 and many of the peer-reviewed journals that
now help to define the field had not yet been established.152
International trade was not taught at many law schools, and
very few US law schools had full-time faculty who specialized
in trade law. As a result, despite its substantial strengths,
when Developing Countries was originally issued it was likely
of interest only to a relatively small number of international
trade practitioners and scholars.
Today, international courses are offered at numerous law
schools, economics departments, public policy schools, and
international relations departments; a growing number of
monographs, essay collections, and journals address trade
issues; and conferences and symposia on international trade
are now common. Moreover, the trade regime is an increasingly
important object of study in several academic disciplines;
specialists in international relations, international political
economy, and international economics devote substantial
attention to the trade system and address questions of great
interest to trade lawyers such as the optimal design of the
trade system, the nature and effects of WTO dispute
settlement, and the function of contingent protection.
150. On the relative marginalization of international trade law in a leading
US journal, see Detlev F. Vagts, International Economic Law and the
American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 769 (2006), which
“discuss[es] the history of international economic law since the American
Journal of International Law was first published,” and David Bederman,
Appraising a Century of Scholarship in the American Journal of International
Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 20 (2006), which describes the great nature of the
“intellectual content and scholarly character” in the American Journal of
International Law.
151. Indeed, it appears that the first article in an American law review on
countervailing and antidumping duties was not published until 1958 (see
footnote 7, supra). Peter Ehrenhaft, Memories of the Supreme Court in the
1961 Term, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 215, 220 (2004).
152. The first edition of the Journal of World Trade was published in 1967.
Other leading journals are even more recent. For example, the Journal of
International Economic Law was first published in 1998, and the World Trade
Review was first published in 2001.
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The influence of these various disciplines upon each other
has been enormous; indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest
that virtually all serious students of the trade regime today
necessarily draw upon insights from disciplines that neighbor
their own.153 Perhaps if Bob Hudec was alive today to produce
an updated edition of his classic text, he would draw
substantially on these literatures. Doing so would enrich
Developing Countries in at least two respects.
First, insights from these cognate literatures could enrich
Developing Countries’ arguments. For example, the lively
debate in international relations circles over the impact of
security-related concerns on trade cooperation might inform
Developing Countries’ reflections on why the U.S. originally
choose to pursue a GATT with larger membership, but
shallower commitments, and why the U.S. later shifted course
and insisted that the Uruguay Round be a single
undertaking.154 Perhaps more importantly, Hudec sets forth a
controversial claim about the relative importance of developing
states’ domestic policy as opposed to preferential access to
developed state markets. As noted above, I take this claim to be
one of the text’s central ideas and hence I believe that
Developing Countries would be a stronger work if it tested this
claim against the substantial literature that addresses the
domestic determinants of economic growth. Doing so could
provide support for many of Hudec’s arguments, help identify
the limits of these arguments, and help position those
arguments within a rich set of scholarly literatures.
Second, locating Developing Countries’ arguments within
their larger scholarly contexts would facilitate dialogue with a
broader scholarly audience. Consider, for example, Hudec’s
work on dispute settlement. His groundbreaking scholarship
helped inspire a generation of empirical research by political
153. Ironically, Hudec himself organized one of the earliest
interdisciplinary projects examining trade law. JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ROBERT
HUDEC, FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?
(1996). The American Law Institute’s publication of annual volumes that
analyze WTO case law is a more recent initiative along these lines. See, e.g.,
THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003 (Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis eds., 2006)
summarizing that year’s studies). For a more recent examination of the ways
that interdisciplinary approaches can enhance understanding of international
legal phenomena, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, CTBS
(forthcoming).
154. Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 359–360
(2002).
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scientists into GATT and WTO dispute settlement.155 Hudec’s
work did so, in part, because it presented data and evidence
about trade disputes in a way that political scientists could
easily understand and utilize.
Developing Countries should likewise be of interest to a
broad and interdisciplinary audience; in addition to
international trade law scholars, the topics Developing
Countries addresses are of interest to a wide variety of
international lawyers, international political economy scholars,
economists, and students of international development and
international relations. Locating the broader questions raised
by Developing Countries in the context of various scholarly
literatures it implicates would make the book both more
accessible and more appealing to a wide variety of readers from
different disciplines. Doing so would render Developing
Countries’ important insights more salient to a broader
audience of readers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Debates over preferential treatment for developing states
have been a defining feature of the multilateral trade system
since its inception. Developing Countries masterfully reviews
the history of this controversy, and will serve as an
authoritative guide to the historical, political and normative
dimensions of the debate over preferential treatment for
developing states. In addition, Developing Countries clearly
details the arguments for and against preferential treatment
and offers an influential critique of preference programs.
But Developing Countries’ value is not simply historical.
Drawing on empirical writings that largely post-date the initial
release of Developing Countries, I have suggested some
additional lines of inquiry inspired by Hudec’s arguments,
including (i) whether preferential programs hinder developing
states’ ability to liberalize; (ii) whether the proliferation of
preferential tariff programs has inadvertently contributed to
the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements,
and, if so, whether these agreements disserve developing state
interests; and (iii) whether the debate over preferences diverts
155. See, e.g., Marc Bush & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade
Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E.
HUDEC 457 (Daniel Kennedy & James Southwick eds., 2002) (surveying and
analyzing empirical studies on GATT/WTO dispute settlement).
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focus from policies more likely to promote developing state
growth. Thus, Hudec’s arguments, combined with recent
empirical work, suggest a research agenda designed to uncover
whether there are hidden costs—or hidden benefits—associated
with the debate over preferential treatment for developing
states. For these reasons, all those interested in international
trade should welcome the opportunity to revisit Developing
Countries.

